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In her recent article "Death, Mis­
fortune, and Species Inequality,"l 
Ruth Cigman gives clear, careful 
expression to an argument which 
seems well on its way to becomi ng a 
classic among opponents of animal 
rights. 2 Cigman's argument runs as 
follows: 
A right to X entails the 
right to be protected against 
certain actions which will 
result in the misfortune, or 
possible misfortu ne, of not-X. 
A condition for being the sub­
ject of a right is therefore the 
capacity to be the subject of 
the corresponding misfortune. 
(49) For a creature to be a 
possible subject of the misfor­
tune of death, life itself must 
be an object of value for it, 
and this possibility is presup­
posedby the right to life; 
otherwise the right to life 
would be a right to be pro­
tected from something which 
could not conceivably be a mis­
fortune, which does not make 
sense. (59) 
The relationship· between 
capacity and desire in this 
context must be examined. My 
suggestion is that, when we 
fill in the concept of desiring 
not to die in a way which is 
relevant to the misfortune of 
death and the right to life, we 
shall have to withhold this 
from animals. (49-50) 
For convenient reference we may 
reduce this argument to the following 
compact form: 
Pl: Only beings capable of valuing 
life itself can suffer the misfortune of 
death. 
P2: On Iy bei ngs capable of 
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suffering the misfortune of death can 
have a right to life. 
P3: Animals are incapable of valu­
ing Iife itself. 
C: Therefore, animals cannot have 
a right to life. 
Each of the premises of this argument 
is dubious. Even P2, which seems 
the safest of the lot, would be chal­
lenged by some rights theorists, such 
as H. L. A. Hart, who hold that 
rights are not essentially devices for 
protecting interests but for securing 
choices. 3 However, we will not pur­
sue this line of criticism here. 
Whether a careful analysis of rights 
would reveal that the right to life 
protects our interest in life, secures 
our choice to remain alive, or some­
thing else, this right seems clearly 
tied to death being a misfortune. 
P3 would certainly be attacked by 
many advocates of animal rights who 
emphasize tIthe evolutionary continuity 
. of mental experience"4 and would claim 
that many animals have sufficiently 
extensive temporal awareness, self­
consciousness, and other requisite 
aspects of rationality to value life 
itself. However, I wi II leave the com­
parison of animal with human psychol­
ogy, rationality, and values to those 
who have carefully studied the matter, 
e.g., the ethologists. The truth or 
falsity of P3 is at least as much a fac­
tual as a conceptual issue and is, 
therefore, not resolvable by philoso­
phers. Cigman emphasizes the com­
plexity of experience in which the 
human awareness and evaluation of 
death occurs, and it seems reasonable 
. to agree with her presumption that 
many of the animals animal rightists 
seek to protect, e. g., rabbits and 
chickens, lack that complexity of 
experience. So, let us pass by objec­
tions to P3. 
The line of questioning I wish to 
pursue here concerns Pl: must one 
value life itself in order to suffer 
death as a misfortune? I question Pl 
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because in so many other cases it is 
not the case that one has to value X 
itself in order to have a right to X. 
Consequently, agreeing that if one 
has a right to X then not-X must be a 
misfortune. for him, it follows that 
not-X can be a misfortune for an 
individual even though he does not 
value X itself. S 
Cigman's argument is a specific 
case of the following argument form: 
Pl': Only beings capable of valu­
ing X itself can suffel' the misfot,tune 
of not-X. 
P2': Only beings capable of suf­
fering not-X as a misfortune can have 
a right to X. 
P3': B is incapable of valuing X 
itself. 
C': Therefore, B cannot have a 
right to X. 
Reflection on our current practice of 
according rights will show that there 
is something wrong with arguments of 
this form. Further reflection will 
show how Pl' (and P3') can be 
revised to yield an acceptable argu­
ment form. However, that form will 
not exclude the possibility of animal 
rights. 
Before proceeding with this analy­
sis, we must clarify what "valuing X 
itself" refers to. It would be obvious 
that we can have a right to X even 
though we do not value X itself, if 
"valuing X itself" meant "X has 
intrinsic value for us rather than (or 
in addition to) instrumental value." 
Whatever "intrinsic value" may mean, 
it is clear that we have rights to 
things which are of merely instrumen­
tal val ue for us, e. g., a speedy trial. 
Cigman's insistence that misfortunes 
be tied to desires (57), her use of 
the ph rase "I ife itself as an object of 
value" (59), her rejection of a utilita­
rian alternative because "it does not 
justify calling death a misfortune for 
the animal who dies" (54), and her 
rejection of Thomas Nagel's analysis of 
the misfortune of death because it 
does not require that "life is some­
thing most of us value and want to 
experience for as long as possible" 
(56) give the impression that some 
sort of shadowy intrinsic value in life 
vs. merely instrumental value for life 
distinction is at work in her argu­
ment. Be that as it may, this distinc­
tion is incidental to the argument and 
should not mislead on into dismissing 
the argument out of hand. The dis­
tinction on which this argument turns 
is that between having an interest in 
X and taking an interest in X, and 
"valuing life itself" should be inter­
preted as "taking an interest in life." 
One can "have an interest" in 
something which affects one's well-be­
ing but of which one is ignorant or 
unconcerned. Vitamins, pesticides, 
and heavy metals in drinking water 
will all affect one's well-being even 
though one has never heard of them 
or even though one is unconcerned 
about them because one does not 
believe they will affect one's well-be­
ing . However, "taking an interest" 
requires that one be aware of the item 
in question, believe that it affects 
one's well-being, and, consequently, 
consciously give a value (positive or 
negative) to the item. Cigman does 
not employ the language of interests, 
but the following passages make clear 
that she is relying on this distinction: 
Death is not a misfortune 
merely because it is a bad 
condition to be in, relative to 
being alive, healthy, and so 
on; rather it is a misfortu ne 
because life is something most 
of us value and wan~ to exe_~­
rience for as long as possible. 
(56, emphasis added) 
I reject the suggestion that 
a categorical desire, or any­
thing of this nature, is attri­
butable to animals. For con­
sider what would have to be 
the case if this were so. 
First, animals would have to 
possess essentially the same 
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conceptions of life and death 
as persons do. The subject of 
a categorical desire must either 
understand death as a condi­
tion which closes a possible 
future forever, and leaves 
behind one a world in which 
one has no part as an agent or 
conscious being of any sort, or 
he must grasp, and then 
reject, this conception of 
death, in favor of a bel ief in 
immortality. Either w~the
radical and exclusive nature of 
the transition from life to 
death must be understood--it 
must at least be appreciated 
why people think in these 
terms--so that the full signifi­
cance of the idea that "X is a 
reason for -Iivin.s" may be 
grasped. (58-59, emphasis 
added) 
It seems accurate to paraphrase 
Cigman as claiming that although ani­
mals may have an interest in life 
(since it is a good condition to be in 
relative to death), they cannot take 
an interest in life (since they are 
incapable of understanding the full 
sign ificance of death). 
This distinction between things 
which affect our interests but in 
which we do not take an interest is 
certainly a real one. But is it rele­
vant to the issue of what it makes 
sense to sayan individual has a right 
to? 
Is it possible to have a right to 
something which affects one's interests 
but of which one is ignorant? Cer­
tainly. People have rights to inheri­
tances they do not know about. Even 
patients who are unaware of "The 
Patient's Bill of Rights" have a right 
to see thei r medical records. And 
people who have never heard of "The 
Universal Declaration of the Rights of 
Man" and have grown up in cultu res 
which not only deny them human 
rights but also have taught them to 
believe they are subhuman are still 
entitled to human rights. There is no 
conceptual, moral, or legal difficulty 
with ascribing a right to X to someone 
who is unaware either of X or of the 
possibility that he could have X or 
the right to X. Having a right to X 
does not require that we actually 
know about, desi re, or value X itself. 
It might be objected that it is not 
actually valuing X itself that is 
required for the right to X but the 
capacity to value X itself which is 
required. Most fundamental moral 
principles involve the idea of capac­
ity, e. g., the capacity to suffer in 
utilitarianism and the capacity to rea­
son in Kantianism. Cigman also 
emphasizes the ~~E.~~J!Y to suffer a 
misfortune. So, perhaps the proper 
question is: is it possible to have a 
right to something which affects one's 
interests but which one is incC!.pable of 
understanding or valuing? Again, 
there are some fairly obvious cases of 
this. Severely retarded, brain-dam­
aged, and senile people have legal 
rights, property rights, civil rights, 
and human rights which they are 
incapable of understanding and valu­
ing. They may value the medical care 
and other benefits property, social 
welfare programs, legal procedures, 
and other things to which they have a 
right secure for them, but they are 
incapable of understanding or valuing 
pr'operty, social welfare institutions, 
legal procedures, human respect, and 
moral obligation themselves. Conse­
quently, current moral and legal prac­
tice show that an individual can have 
a right to X even though he is inca­
pable of understanding and valuing X. 
This conclusion might be criticized 
for ignoring the normality dimension 
of the idea of "capacity". Cigman 
emphasizes what people !!.orm.!L\y value 
in her discussion of the misfortune of 
death and in circumventing the possi­
ble counterexample of suicidal people. 
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Similarly, Stanley Benn contends that 
animal rights arguments referring to 
inconsistency in extending righh to 
subrational humans while denying them 
to more rational animals are fallacious 
because rights are extended primarily 
not to individuals but to species based 
on the capabilities of normal members 
of the species. 6 So, the proper ques­
tion may be: is it possible to have a 
right to something which affects one's 
interests but which even normal 
beings of one's kind are incapable of 
understanding or valuing? Of course, 
it is impossible for us to refer to any 
actual cases concerning human beings 
where this happens. Such examples 
would require that we understand 
things human beings are incapable of 
understanding. However, the follow­
ing non-human example seems plausi­
ble enough to show at least that a 
positive answer to this question is not 
nonsensical. 
Cigman acknowledges, as do most 
opponents of an animal right to life, 
that an ima Is shou Id be spa red un nec­
essary suffering. Now, industrial pol­
lution causes many animals avoidable 
suffering, but animals are incapable of 
understanding how industrial pollu­
tants affect their habitats, undermine 
thei r health, and cause them to suf­
fer. It follows that although animals 
suffer from a polluted environment, 
they are incapable of valuing a pollu­
tant-free environment. But does it 
also follow, as Cigman would have to 
claim, that it would be nonsensical to 
say that animals whose well-being is 
destroyed by industrial pollution are 
suffering a misfortune in losing their 
healthy habitats and have a right (call 
it the "right to a healthful envi ron­
menttl ) to be protected against indus­
trial pollution? We encounter no con­
ceptual difficulty in asserting that 
people have a right to a healthful 
environment. Is the fact that people 
normally can but animals normally 
cannot understand how industrial pol­
lutants cause them to suffer morally 
significant enough to show that ani­
mals cannot conceivably share in this 
right? Since many of the forms of 
suffering caused by industrial pollu­
tants, e. g., blindness, debilitation, 
cancer, and birth defects, are shared 
by human and non-human animals, 
reference to the normal capacity for 
understanding which differentiates 
human from non-human animals would 
seem not only to be insufficiently 
weighty to justify such a claim but 
also to be so totally beside the point 
as to be a blatant rationalization of 
anth ropocentric prej udice. 
It might be objected that 
(a) since animals take an interest 
in suffering, suffering can be misfor­
tune for them; 
(b) consequently, animals can, at 
least as far as Cigman's argument is 
concerned, have a right not to suffer; 
(c) the right to a healthful envi­
ronment is just a part of this right 
not to suffer, since a healthful envi­
ronment is essential to avoid suffer­
ing; 
(d) therefore, the example of the 
right to a healthful envi ronment does 
not show that animals can have rights 
to things they are incapable of valu­
ing. 
An obvious problem with such an 
objection is that a healthful environ­
ment is not really "a part of" not suf­
fering. However, setting aside such 
technical problems, we may note that 
using (a) and (b) in conjunction with 
the following modification of (c) yields 
the conclusion that animals can have a 
right to life: 
(c') the right to life is a part of 
the right not to suffer, since life is 
essential to avoid suffering. 
One can avoid suffering by dying, of 
course, but what is ordinarily valued 
under the label of "avoiding suffer­
ing" is not merely the absence of suf­
fering but a life free of suffering. It 
is such a life that requi res a healthful 
environment, so any sort of "negative 
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utilitarianism" rebuttal here is already 
ruled out by (c). Consequently, the 
pattern of analysis in (a) through (d) 
cannot be used to support the claim 
that animals cannot have a right to 
life. 
I find the inability to understand 
what is causing one to suffer to be 
morally insignificant where avoidable 
suffering is involved, and the almost 
universal rejection of cruelty to ani­
mals, without requiring prior analysis 
of their level of understanding, sug­
gests that my judgment is not anoma­
lous. Until more persuasive argument 
is forthcoming, I conclude that beings 
can have rights to things which nor­
mal beings of thei r kinds are incapa­
ble of understanding and valuing. 
These three possibilities, igno­
rance, individual inability to under­
stand, and normal inability to under­
stand, seem to cover the field. So, I 
conclude that taking an interest in or 
valuing X itself is not a necessary 
condition for having a right to X. 
Since all the cases just discussed sat­
isfy P3 ' , the problem with the above 
argument form must lie in Pl' or P2'. 
But Cigman's claim that rights entail 
corresponding misfortunes (P2') was 
conceded, so the failure of this argu­
ment form must lie in Pl t, the claim 
that suffering the misfortune of not-X 
requires taking an interest in X. In 
all the above examples, the individuals 
who did not or could not take an 
interest in X nonetheless had an 
interest in X. This suggests that we 
can correct the above argument form 
by substituting the following for Pl I 
(and P3'): 
Pl" Only beings which have an 
interest in X can suffer the misfor­
tune of not-X. 
P3" B has no interest in X. 
Pl" not on Iy accommodates the 
above counterexamples to Pl'; it also 
excludes stones, works of art, 
machines, and other inanimate objects 
which are incapable of having rights 
if anything is. Such things cannot 
have interests, since they have no 
well-being of their own, any evalua­
tion of their condition being derived 
from other beings which have or take 
an interest in them. The case of 
plants and insentient animals is a bit 
more problematic. Since they can 
flou rish or wither, it makes sense to 
say they have a well-being of their 
own, an excellence or virtue of their 
own nature, as Aristotle would say. 
On the other hand, they cannot be 
covered by standard moral principles, 
such as the principle of utility, which 
are concerned with happiness and not 
merely with flou rishing. ·1 suggest 
handling this problem in the following 
way: since moral principles are fun­
damentally concerned with happiness 
or rationality, not with growth or 
even health, we should interpret "B 
has an interest in X" tg the !!1_C?I~
relevant sense to mean 'X has (or will 
have or is likely to have) an effect on 
B's feelings of well-being (e.g., 
pleasure, feeling fit, enthusiasm, con­
tentment) or his judgments about his 
well-being. " It follows that plants 
and insentient animals do not have 
interests in the morally relevant sense 
and that all beings have morally rele­
·vant interests only where their feel­
ings or judgments of well-being are 
involved. It fu rther follows, accord­
ing to the revised argument form, 
that no being can have rights in areas 
where its· feelings or judgments of 
well-being are not affected. 7 That 
seems to be placing the distinction 
where it belongs. 
Returning to the specific case of 
the misfortune of death and the right 
to life, the only way to save Cigman's 
argument would seem to be somehow to 
show that death and the right to· life 
is a special case: although in all the 
sorts of cases just discussed being a 
possible subject of misfortune and 
rights does not requi re the ability to 
take an interest, in the case of the 
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misfortune of death and the right to 
life one must be able to value life 
itself because . . . . . . I do 
not know how to fill in that blank, 
which leaves me with the following 
speculation and conclusion. 
Speculation: We commonly call 
death a .misfortune, so when Cigman 
claims that the right to life presup­
poses the possibility of suffering the 
misfortune of death, that seems rea­
sonable enough. However, as she 
progresses through her argument, she 
ties "misfortune" to valuing, in the 
sense of taking an interest, thereby 
giving "misfortune" a technical mean­
ing which does not quite fit with its 
common use. It would not be more 
unusual to describe a pelican born 
blind as "unfortunate" or having "suf­
fered a misfortune" or even "tragic" 
(since it will certainly die from this 
affliction) than it would be to so 
describe a human infant born blind. 
This unnoticed equivocation on "mis­
fortune" (technical use in Pl but 
common use in P2) is what makes the 
argument seem plausible. 
Conclusion: Pl is false. One can 
suffer the misfortune of death even 
though one lacks the inteilectual 
capacity for taking an interest in or 
valuing life itself. Assuming no after­
life awaits one--the traditional assump­
tion in the case of animals--that is not 
hard to understand: death is ordinar­
ily a misfortune for an individual 
(whether he knows it or not) because 
it totally eliminates the possibility of 
his further happiness. For a highly 
rational, self-conscious being the mis­
fortune of death may have additional 
sources, e.g., the frustration of cat­
egorical desires, but this annihilation 
of the possibility of happiness is suf­
ficient to render death a serious 
enough, morally significant loss to be 
a misfortune. That death is commonly 
not considered a misfortune but a 
blessing when this possibility has 
already been eliminated by disease or 
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accident adds credence to this inter­
pretation. Consequently, even if ani­
mals cannot attend to, understand the 
importance of, and value life itself, it 
does not follow that they cannot suf­
fer the misfortune of death nor that it 
would be nonsensical to extend the 
right to life to them to protect them 
from this misfortune. 
One last criticism might be made at 
this point: it might be objected that 
for an individual to suffer the misfor­
tune of death, death must be a mis­
fortune for him and this is not 
accountedfor by the above analysis. 
Cigman writes: 
If the worst that can be 
said of the quick and painless 
death of an animal is that it 
removes a quantity of pleasu­
rable experience from the 
world, this does not justify 
call that death a misfortune for 
the animal who dies. (54) 
Phrases of the foriTl"not-X is a mis­
fortune for B" are ambiguous. They 
may be equivalent to "not-X is B's 
misfortune" or to "B considers not-X 
a misfortune." Even this latter option 
is ambiguous, since it may be equiva­
lent to "B judges not-X to be a mis­
fortune" or to "B directly experiences 
not-X to be a misfortune." 
Surveying these alternatives, we 
can see that the last is too strong for 
an acceptable analysis of the misfor­
tune of death. There are some forms 
of death which we cannot directly 
experience but which we want to be 
protected against by the right to life 
and, therefore, want to have counted 
as misfortunes. For example, we can­
not directly experience a sudden 
death while in a deep sleep to be a 
misfortune. 8 On the other hand, the 
second alternative is too weak, since 
we can judge to be misfortunes things 
which do not affect ou r lives. For 
example, I would judge that the mem­
bers of The People's Temple who suf.. 
fered a mass death in Guyana three 
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years ago suffered a misfortune, but 
it certainly does not follow that I have 
suffered the misfortune of death. 
This leaves only. the "not-X is B's 
misfortune" alternative as a suitable 
interpretation of "death is a misfor­
tune for B," and the above analysis 
of the misfortune of death accounts 
for that alternative. Death is a mis­
fortune for an animal because it is its 
possibility of future happiness, and 
not merely some anonymous "quantity 
of pleasu rable experience," which is 
destroyed by its death. So, the claim 
that to suffer the misfortune of death 
death must be a misfortune for the 
one who dies does not constitute an 
objection to an animal's death being a 
misfortune. 9 
Common usage confirms this conclu­
sion. Recent a young woman was 
wal king along a San Francisco street 
on a stormy night. As she walked 
past an old building, a large piece of 
the building's concrete parapet fell 
from the sixth floor and struck her on 
the head. She never knew what hit 
her; she died instantly. No one 
would feel any hesitation in saying 
this was a misfortune for the young 
woman (not just for her family and 
friends), even though she experienced 
no fear of impending death nor any 
sense of frustration of her plans for 
the future. The misfortune is that 
here was a young woman "cut off in 
the prime of life," a young woman 
"with her whole life ahead of her," a 
young woman who will never have the 
chance to experience "the joys life 
might have brought her." These 
common expressions do not refer to 
the young woman's philosophy of life, 
feelings at dying, or prospects for 
the future. They refer to the happy 
life she might have had but now never 
will, and that is very sad. The same 
can be said for a caracul lamb killed 
less than a day out of its mother's 
womb or a baby seal killed when only 
a few days old or a veal calf slaugh­
tered when only a few months old. 
Their early deaths are misfortunes for 
them, for they, too, are cut off in 
the prime of life, had their whole 
lives ahead of them, and will never 
know the joys life might have brought 
them. These cases, too, are very 
sad, and if we can set aside our sen­
timental bias in favor of ou r oWn spec­
ies, we can see that we have the same 
reasons for saying that a misfortune 
has befallen these animals as we do 
for saying that a misfortune has befal­
len the young woman killed by the 
falling parapet. 
In closing I would like briefly to 
discuss one other, unfortunate classic 
to be found in Cigman's paper. She 
asserts that advocates of animal rights 
who draw an analogy between specie­
sism and racism and sexism are claim­
ing that 
as women and blacks should 
have equal· rights to those of 
men and whites, animals should 
have rights equal to those of 
persons, because difference of 
species does not constitute a 
morally relevant difference. (47) 
Apparently, many people have been 
offended by the suggestion that there 
is an analogy between species ism and 
racism and sexism. 1 D They seem to 
feel that it is absu rd to suggest that 
animal welfare issues have the same 
moral importance as human justice 
issues and that the analogy demeans 
efforts to secure human justice. Per­
haps it is these feelings which lead 
opponents of animal rights. so often to 
misrepresent the animal rights move­
ment as a call for equal rights. 
The prejudice of speciesism does 
not lie in denying animals the same 
set of rights enjoyed by humans. 
Animals have no interest in equal edu­
cational or vocational opportunities, so 
it would be nonsensical to suggest 
that they should share human rights 
to them. Similarly, the prejudice of 
speciesism does not lie in believing 
that human life, with its greater 
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range of capabilities for making the 
world a morally better' place, has a 
greater moral worth than animal life. 
Peter Singer, for example, explicitly 
acknowledges that if one is forced to 
choose between preserving a human 
life or an animal's life, it would (in 
most cases) not be speciesist to prefer 
the human life. 11 The prejudice of 
speciesism lies in denying the inter~
ests of animals equal consideration 
with the Ii ke interests of humans. 
Just as it would be immoral to fol­
low Swift's modest proposal 12 routinely 
(and avoidably) to sacrifice some peo­
ple's interest in life to fulfill others' 
interest in food, so it should be 
immoral routinely (and avoidably) to 
sacrifice animals' interest in life for 
that pu rpose. Species differences do 
not morally justify such routine, avoi­
dable sacrifice of animal interests in 
favor of human interests. This is the 
sort of proposal animal rightists are 
making. The analogy, then, between 
speciesism and racism and sexism is 
that humans regard animals as beings 
whose interests may be routinely sac­
rificed for the fulfillment of their 
(human) desires, much as whites and 
men have regarded blacks and women 
as beings whose interests do not merit 
equal consideration with their own. 
The animal rights movement pres~
ents at least as serious a challenge to 
contemporary morality and lifestyle as 
do the civil rights and women's move­
ments, if seriousness be measured by 
the number of individuals involved, 
the fact that life or death is often at 
issue, or the changes in morality and 
lifestyle that the success of the move­
ment would occasion. This movement 
neither insults the moral significance 
of the civil rights and women's rights 
movements nor makes absu rd claims 
that can be demonstrated to be non­
sensical. William James said that reac­
tion to philosophical movements passes 
through several phases, the first of 
which is to portray the movement as 
nonsense. Hopefully, criticism of 
animal rights will soon exit this 
phase. 
Steve F. Sapontzis� 
Univerity�California State  
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5.�	 Readers who may be concerned 
that I am now talking about "valu­
ing" while P1 talks about being 
"capable of valuing," need not 
worry. After establishing the 
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meaning of "valuing" something, I 
intend to discuss the moral 
(in)significance both of valuing 
life itself and of the capacity for 
valuing life itself. 
6.� Nomos~: pp. 62 ff.	 Equality, 
The relevant passages can also be 
found· on pages 160-161 of Peter 
Singer's "All Animals Are Equal," 
in Animal Rights and Human Obli­
gatiOnS:- eds. Tom -Regan -and 
Peter Singer (Englewood Cliffs: 
Prentice-Hall, 1976). 
7.� Acknowledging the possibility of 
extended rights, such as those of 
a trustee administering an 
orphan's estate, would require 
some qualification of this conclu­
sion. But such qualifications, 
e.g., "one can have rights only in 
those areas which affect one's feel­
ings or judgments about one's 
well-being or the well-being of 
those as whose agent one is act­
ing," would not undermine the 
present argument. Nor would add­
ing the usual caveats concerning 
capacity and normalcy. 
8.� Suffering loss is not essentially	 a 
tied to suffering unpleasant feel­
ings at the loss. "He suffered a 
great loss without even knowing 
it" is not a paradoxical statement; 
it refers to such mundane things 
as unknowingly putting a rare 
penny in a gumball machine and 
failing to answer a phone call 
which would have earned one a 
great prize. Failing to recognize 
this difference between suffering a 
loss and other kinds of suffering 
may have misled some philosophers 
into believing that only those 
capable of experiencing some feel­
ing of grief, frustration, etc., at 
(the prospect of) death are capa­
ble of suffering the misfortune of 
death. Also, the possibility of 
suffering a 
unpleasant 
should not 
possibility 
where what 
loss without suffering 
feelings at the loss 
be confused w-fih the 
of suffering a loss 
is lost will not affect 
one's feelings even in the condi­
tional sense that if one had had X 
(or if X had occu rred), then one's 
life would have been happier (or 
more satisfying or less unpleasant, 
etc.). How this latter possibility 
is to be understood and what, if 
any, moral significance it may 
have are controversies we need 
not enter into here, for I am not 
attempting to defend the possibil­
ity of an animal right to life on 
the basis of that latter possibility. 
9. Epicurus contended that an indi­
vidual's death could not be a mis­
fortune for him because while he 
is alive he cannot suffer it and 
when he is dead he cannot suffer 
anything. The above analysis 
indicates that it is the living who 
suffer the misfortune of death. 
This is not self-contradictory, 
because (although some may brood 
about it beforehand) the living 
suffer this misfortune only when 
they die. Harry Silverstein has 
recently contended (in "The Evil 
of Death," The Journal of Philoso­
~ LXXYII17(1980)) that such a 
deprivation resolution" of "Epicu­
rus' dilemma" will not work, 
because it includes a life-death 
comparison which presupposes that 
death has a value for the dead 
person, which is impossible. Sil­
verstein confuses death as the loss 
of a possibility (further life) with 
death as the actualization of an 
alternative possibility (a world in 
which the individual is no longer 
alive). It is the former which 
(ordinarily) involves the misfor­
tu ne of death., viz., the loss of 
the� possibility offurther happi­
ness, and the subject of the loss 
of life is the living person who 
dies. 
10.� For see Francis and	 example, 
Norman, 92. cit., p. 527 (tithe 
equation of animal welfare with 
genuine liberation movements such 
as black liberation, women 's libera~
tion, or gay liberation has the 
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effect of trivializing those real lib­-
eration movements") and Watson, 
9£. cit., p. 119 ("Singer's claim 
that the struggle against the tyr­-
anny of human over nonhuman 
animals is a struggle as important 
as any of the moral and social 
issues that have been fought over 
in recent years is insulting to past 
and recent victims of moral and 
social oppression "). 
11.� Peter Singer, Liberation Animal 
(New York: Avon~ook~T977), 
pp. 20-22. As in other emergency 
situations, where one has to 
choose between saving the young 
or the old, the infi rm or the 
healthy, etc., what would ordinar­-
ily not make a significant moral 
difference can make such a differ­-
ence. 
12.� Swift proposed that the Irish
problem, too many people and too 
little money, be solved by selling 
Irish infants for English roasts. 
Jonathan Swift, "A Modest Propo­-
sal for Preventing the Children of 
Poor Parents from Being a Bu rthen 
to Their Parents or Country, and 
for Making Them Beneficial to the 
People" (1729); reprinted in Ani­-
mal Rights and Human Obligations. 
